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Hospital financing and the development and adoption of new technologies 
Abstract 
 
We study the influence of different reimbursement systems, namely Prospective Payment System, 
Cost Based Reimbursement System and Mixed Reimbursement System on the development and 
adoption of different technologies with an endogenous supply of these technologies. We focus our 
analysis on technology development and adoption under two models: private R&D and R&D within 
the hospital. One of the major findings is that the optimal reimbursement system is a pure Prospective 
Payment System or a Mixed Reimbursement System depending on the market structure. 
 
Keywords: Prospective Payment System; Cost Based Reimbursement; R&D 
 
JEL classification: I11, O33 
 
 
1 Introduction
Technological progress has been identiÞed as one of the major contributors
to the rising health care expenditure (Newhouse (1992)) with changes in
treatment accounting for most of the growth in spending on speciÞc dis-
eases (Cutler, McClellan and Remler (1998); Cutler et al (1998)). This
contribution is a product of two processes: the development and the adop-
tion of technologies, both of fundamental importance for the development
of both health beneÞts and costs. Given the preponderance of technology
on total health care expenditure it urges the study of mechanisms behind
the development, adoption and diusion of technology. One of the possible
factors that might aect the technology market is the health regulatory pol-
icy. If the regulation on the health care market can stimulate innovation,
this has profound implications for the health policy targets and the choice
of instruments to pursue them.
Our goal in this paper is to build a theoretical setting which allows the
analysis of the inßuence of prospective, cost based and mixed reimbursement
on the development and adoption of new technologies with an endogenous
supply of these technologies. Incorporating, both, the demand and supply
side of the innovation market we can examine the full welfare eects of
reimbursement policies. The main dierence with the existing literature is
that we endogeneise the technology supply.
The idea that dierent reimbursement systems lead to the adoption of
dierent types of technology has been widely defended in the existing liter-
ature (Romeo, Wagner and Lee (1984); Gelijins and Rosenberg (1994) and
Cutler and McClellan (1996)). Nonetheless, there has been some tendency
to treat technology development as a black box. Indeed, although much of
the existing literature targeted the eects of alternative policy instruments
on technology innovation, the focus was constrained to the eects of pol-
icy on technology adoption and diusion. In reality, this body of literature
shows that the technology adopted by hospitals is sensitive to reimbursement
policies but little attention has been paid on the externality of these policies
on the supply side of the R&D process. While Cost Based Reimbursement
is believed to create incentives for the provision of quality for any cost level,
hospitals that are reimbursed through a Prospective Payment System (PPS)
scheme focus on short-run cost savings rather than on treatment quality.
Even though these studies contribute to the study of the eect of health
Þnancing policies on technology adoption, we believe that the way in which
the R&D sector is aected by these policies is an important issue and has
not been explored by the existing literature.
1
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Indeed, beyond such case studies, just a limited literature (partly) doc-
uments how recent changes in the Þnancial ßows taking place in the health
care market are aecting the rate and pattern of innovation. Nevertheless,
the above described studies seem to open the door to the conjecture on
the relation between the R&D market and the underlying health care in-
stitutional set up, by allowing to further infer on the relation between the
patterns of technological change and the health care Þnancial ßows.
The diusion process of existing technologies may feed back into the
R&D sector since the incentives to create new technologies depend on the
propensity to apply them. If dierent reimbursement schemes create dier-
ent demands for innovation then it must be the case that they also inßuence
the R&D sector decisions. In fact, some early studies (Weisbrod (1991)
and Palmeri (2001)) already point in this direction. Weisbrod (1991) states
that fee for service insurance biases the innovation/adoption process toward
higher quality but higher cost technologies. Palmeri (2001) describes an
example of how payment systems can aect technological innovations. For
cochlear implants, the Medicaid payment was below its average cost, making
hospitals reducing the use of its supply.
In another study, McClellan and Kessler (2002) analyze the incentives
behind technological change. Namely the author analyses to what extent the
patterns of technological change are somehow correlated with the underlying
incentive mechanisms that regulate the provision of health care. The factors
identiÞed as being responsible for technological change are mostly supply
side incentives having as target hospitals.
Furthermore, another study by Weisbrod and LaMay (1999) show some
evidence on the fact prospective payment system being favorable to costly
technologies. By comparing the prices of 468 original DRG categories estab-
lished in 1983 with the prices of the twenty categories added in the following
decade, the authors conclude that after the implementation of the DRG sys-
tem almost all the new DRGs, such as liver transplantation, were associated
to higher payment levels
Still on the same article, the authors present a study on the role of mixed
signals from public policy and the future of health care R&D. The study fo-
cus on the impact of the U.S. health insurance system on the incentives
facing the R&D sector. By examining the Medicare DRG system, the au-
thors state that even though such a regulatory system could, potentially,
have a negative impact on the adoption of costly innovations as it happened
for the cochlear implant technology for the deaf, there is still some evidence
suggesting that quality enhancing innovations consisting of major medical
advances will keep on being adopted and developed despite of, to some ex-
2
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tent, its cost implications.
Behind these studies resides the belief that the survival of an innovation
depends on whether it is perceived as worthwhile by the organizations that
will directly determine whether it is adopted and the scale of use. If the
innovation is to persist and expand in use, it must be the case that the
market perceives it as being proÞtable to adopt and employ, meaning that,
in our context, the hospital must view the treatment as e!cacious.
From the R&D Þrm perspective, the two main elements ruling the ex-
pected proÞtability of a particular new technology are the size of the market
and the price at which it will be sold at, meaning, in our context, the rate
of use by the hospital and the reimbursement levels. Together these factors
determine the revenue side of the market.
In other words, given that the development of new technologies is inßu-
enced by the potential demand for particular innovation, the preferences,
rules and behavior of these various actors exert an important inßuence on
not only on the path but also on the rate of development and adoption of
new technologies.
Despite constituting a starting point to the study of the relation between
health care and R&D markets, the studies above described lack of a theoret-
ical base able to allow the generalization of such Þndings. Indeed, the only
two theoretical papers linking reimbursement policies and development of
new technologies are the ones by Goddeeris (1984) and Baumgardner (1991).
The Þrst author allows for an endogenous supply of this technologies. In both
articles results show that there is a link between technology and the Þnancial
context in the health care sector. Indeed, the Þrst author Þnds that insur-
ance biases technological change in the direction of innovations that increase
medical expenditure, whereas the second, by investigating the relationship
between technical change, welfare and type os insurance contract, concludes
that the value of a speciÞc development in technology depends on the type
of insurance contract.
Therefore, this paper presents two models, one where the R&D and the
hospital are two separate agents and a second where the R&D process is done
within the hospital. The former illustrates cases where the technology to be
used in medical treatment represents a variation of a technology originally
developed in another market (eg. laser) while the latter illustrates those
technologies that are speciÞcally developed for the health market. Both
models are solved for the technologies optimal quality and cost decreasing
levels and for the decision on optimal reimbursement by a central planner.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we describe brießy
the common features of the model, in section 3 we study the private R&D
3
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case, in the following section we analyze the model when R&D is carried out
within the hospital and, Þnally, section 5 draws the conclusions.
2 The model
We study an economy with a continuum of identical patients of mass stan-
dardized to one.
The number of agents varies with the setting up of the model. In the
model of private R&D (section 3) the R&D Þrm and the hospital are two
separate agents. In this case the economy has three agents: the government,
the R&D Þrm and the hospital. Given the reimbursement schedule decided
by the government, the hospital decides on the level of quality to be provided
and buys the technology from the R&D Þrm at a price w. While in the second
model (section 4) R&D within the hospital, the economy has two agents:
the hospital and the government. Also here the government decides on
the optimal reimbursement to the hospital and the hospital decides on the
technology to be developed.
Prior to technology development and adoption, treatment with quality
t0 A 0 may be provided at an original marginal cost of h0 A 0 and this
treatment is processed by the use of a single technology.
One can think about the development of a new technology as, on one
hand, a product innovation and, on the other hand, a process innovation.
Our technology covers both aspects. It is characterized by two parameters: t
and h . The Þrst, t> is a treatment quality parameter that is composed by two
elements, the existing quality level t0 and the quality innovation parameter
t that represents the product innovation deÞned by t = t0 t. The second,
h, a cost formula function of the status quo marginal cost h0 and a cost
decreasing parameter h that represents the process innovation. Increasing t
decreases treatment quality and, increasing h, decreases treatment marginal
cost.
Developing technology is assumed to involve quality t
2
2 , design costs-
h2
2 and other technology production costs. For simplicity, we will assume
that, as the design costs are so big when compared with the cost of pro-
ducing technology, the latest are negligible and thus set to zero1. The cost
1The cost speciÞcation might seem awkward in the sense that quality decreasing tech-
nology increase costs via t
2
2 (while also decreasing demand). Other, more plausible cost
functions have been tried namely
F = f (t 3 t0) (h3 h0) + t
2
2
+
h2
2
4
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associated with quality, t
2
2 > can be thought of as the costs inherent to the
basic research aimed at deriving the fundamental knowledge behind the de-
velopment of new technologies2.
Quality decreasing technologies might be justiÞed by, for example, the
need to ration demand. Such quality decreasing technology could be costly
if it implied the need to use less productive inputs. Or we can interpret t
2
2
as a cost arising from an altruistic concern about providing low quality.
We assume a continuum of individuals of mass standardized to one.
Individuals are heterogeneous on their tastes represented by } uniformly
distributed on the interval
£
12 > 12
¤
. Patients utility from not consuming
any medical care is assumed to be
X = 0
While the utility from receiving medical care is represented by,
X = t  sf   |}  {|
With t = t0  t standing for the level of quality of the treatment received;
sf for the price paid for medical care and  |}  {| the disutility incurred
from obtaining care at a provider which location { diers from the most
preferred location }. Without loss of generality we assume that the hospital
is located at { = 0. Moreover, being a public health system patients receive
treatment free of charge, i.e., sf = 0=
Given patients preferences the demand faced by the hospital is given by
G = 2t0  t
= d (t0  t) with d =
2

With consumer surplus being,
FV = (t0  t)
2
 =
d (t0  t)2
2
The Þrst order conditions from these other speciÞcations are not tractable and therefore
a closed form solution is not obtainable.
2Note that the cost of decreasing quality is assumed the same as the one of increasing
quality. Despite not being the mot realistic assumption it allows to have a smooth function
and therefore avoid the kinks that would arise otherwise.
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3 Private R&D
3.1 The Model
In this set-up we have three agents: one hospital, one R&D Þrm and the
government. The hospital supplies treatment to patients and buys technol-
ogy from the R&D Þrm at a price w= This price paid can be thought as a
royalty, i.e. the hospital pays an amount w for each utilization of technology.
Alternatively, one can think that each patient requires one unit of technol-
ogy. This situation can be illustrated with the example of drugs. In this
case for each patient to be treated, the hospital will need to buy one pack
of drugs at a price w=
The cost associated with quality, t
2
2 > is borne by the hospital. The as-
sumption that these costs are borne by the hospital, can be justiÞed by
the fact that the hospital is the agent with more information concerning
the dierent diseases and the dierent treatments e!cacy in treating those
diseases. The design cost h
2
2 will be paid by the R&D Þrm.
As patients demand for treatment only depends on quality, the hospital
decides on the quality level that will provide t.
The R&D Þrm decides on the price -w- and on the level of cost decreasing
parameter h=
Finally, the government decides on the reimbursement scheme. As in-
struments the government will use U (prospective payment system fee) and
u (cost based reimbursement rate).
Therefore, we are in the presence of a pure Prospective Payment System
when U A 0 but u = 0= A pure Cost Based reimbursement system is char-
acterized by U = 0> u A 0= Finally, a reimbursement scheme is classiÞed as
being mixed for U A 0, u A 0.
3.2 Timing
The game will be developed in three stages as described in the following
diagram,
R&D
(e,t)
Government
(R,r)
Hospital
(q)
6
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In the Þrst stage the reimbursement system will be decided, that is, the
government, optimally, decides between the implementation of one of three
regimes: Cost Based Reimbursement System (CBR), Prospective Payment
System (PPS) and mixed system (MRS). We assume that quality is not
observable and therefore not reimbursed.
In a Cost Based Reimbursement system the hospital costs are fully or
partly reimbursed ex-post. In this system, reimbursement is based on the
incurred costs. We assume that hospitals are reimbursed on its costs through
a reimbursement rate u  0. For u ? 1 the hospital is partly reimbursed on
its costs, u = 1 we are in the presence of full reimbursement and u A 1 could
be interpreted as a subsidy.
Under a prospective reimbursement system (PPS) the hospital payment
is determined ex ante and the reimbursement is independent of the costs
that the hospital will incur when treatment is provided. Throughout the
paper, we will assume that the prospective reimbursement consists of a
per case payment, that is, the hospital is paid a fee U A 0 for each pa-
tient treated. This reimbursement could be thought as a Diagnostic Related
Groups System (DRG-system) where, for sake of simplicity, only one group
is considered for our analysis (patients are homogeneous on illness type as
well as on severity).
Finally a Mixed Reimbursement System (MRS) is just a combination of
PPS and CBR, i.e., a scheme where u A 0 and U A 0=
In the second stage the R&D Þrm will decide on the technology price to
charge to the hospital as well on the technology parameter h that will be
developed.
Finally, on the last stage, the hospital will decide on the quality t pro-
vided.
The model will be solved backwards.
3.3 The hospital
For a patients treatment demand G = dt, the hospital proÞt function is as
follows,
K = Udt + (u  1)(h0  h+ w)dt 
t2
2
(1)
With t = t0  t=
Being a proÞt maximizer agent the hospital problem is given by,
7
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max
t
Udt + (u  1)(h0  h+ w)dt 
t2
2
v=w= t  0
Maximizing with respect to t, the optimum is characterized by the Þrst
order condition,
dU (u  1) (h0  h+ w) d t = 0
Solving the Þrst order condition the optimum is given by3,
tW = d [(1 u)(h0  h+ w)U] (2)
Having that t = t0  t then, the optimal quality level is given by
tW = t0  d [(1 u)(h0  h+ w)U]
Proceeding with some comparative statics,
Ct
Cw  0>
CtW
Cw ? 0
CtW
CU A 0
CtW
Cu A 0
CtW
Ch0
? 0 Ct
W
Ct0
A 0 (3)
The quality of treatment supplied to patients, t, is increasing with the
initial quality level, it is decreasing with the status quo marginal costs h0.
Also, as expected, it is decreasing with the technology price w. Furthermore,
it is always increasing in the reimbursement fee U and reimbursement rate u.
Indeed, by increasing quality, the hospital boosts demand and, consequently,
revenues. The proÞtability of this demand increase will be higher the higher
the marginal revenue for each patient, i.e., the reimbursement rate either U
or u (or both). It will never be optimal for the hospital to demand technology
that reduces completely the level of quality, i.e., t = t0. Indeed, this would
imply zero demand and, consequently, negative proÞts. Therefore, we can
focus our analysis on a range of parameters such that t ? t0.
3.4 The R&D Þrm
The R&D Þrm will, through a proÞt maximizing problem and anticipating
the hospital behavior, choose the level of h and the technology price w ensur-
ing that the hospital makes non negative proÞts, that is, its objective will
be deÞned by,
3Note that the second order conditions are always satisÞed as C
2K
Ct2 = 31 ? 0
8
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max
h>w
wdt  h
2
2
v=w= h  h0, K (h> w; h0> t0)  K (h0> t0) > t0  t A h0  h
tW = d [(1 u)(h0  h+ w)U]
with the Þrst condition imposing an upper bound on the amount of the cost
decreasing factor and, the second representing the participation constraint
of the hospital, i.e. that the hospital is better o with new technology,
t0  t A h0  h ensures that the beneÞt for the consumer that has a higher
treatment beneÞt (the one located at } = 0) is higher than the social cost
of treatment and, Þnally, the third representing the optimal choice by the
hospital.
Proposition 1 For w ? h the hospital participation constraint for the hos-
pital is satisÞed.
Proof. Denote } = w h. Then the hospital proÞt can be written as
K = Udt + (u  1)(h0 + })dt 
t2
2
We have that CKC} =  (t0  t) (1 u) meaning that for
CK
C} 6= 0 we need
u 6= 1 and t0 6= t. Since u 5 [0> 1] we are left with the case u ? 1.
Now we have that CKCt |t=t0 = t0  d [U (1 u) (h0 + })] and for } = 0
=, CKCt |t=t0 ? 0 implying that tW ? t0. Recall CKC} =  (t0  t) (1 u)
meaning that the hospital proÞt is decreasing in }= Therefore in order for
the hospital to prefer buying technology than not buying, i.e. to ensure
K (h> w; h0> t0)  K (h0> t0) it is enough to ensure }  0 =, w  h=Q.E.D.
Solving the maximization problem we Þnd two solution types depend-
ing on the level of the initial marginal cost h0. The following propositions
summarize these results. For high (initial) marginal cost of treatment,
Proposition 2 Let 1 d2 (1 u)  0 a 2 d2 (1 u) A 0 a h0 5
h
t0+dU
13u >
min
n
t0
d(13u) +
U
13u >
(dU+t0)(1+d)
2+d(13u)
oi
or 1 d2 (1 u) ? 0 a 2 d2 (1 u) A 0
a h0 5
h
dt0+d2U
2 >
n
t0
d(13u) +
U
13u >
(dU+t0)(1+d)
2+d(13u)
oi
, then, the constraint h  h0
is slack. At the optimum, technology developed and adopted is cost decreasing
and for h0 A
dU+t0[d2(13u)31]
d(13u) is quality decreasing, for h0 ?
dU+t0[d2(13u)31]
d(13u)
9
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increases quality and for h0 =
dU+t0[d2(13u)31]
d(13u) is quality neutral. This equi-
librium is characterized by,
hW = d [U+ (u  1) h0] d+ t0d2 (u  1) + 2 A 0 (4)
wW = d [(1 u) h0 U] t0
d
h
d2 (u  1)2 + 2 (u  1)
i A 0
tW = d [(1 u) h0 U] + t0
£
1 + d2 (u  1)
¤
d2 (u  1) + 2
Proof. Proof in Appendix
Intuitively, ceteris paribus, the higher the initial marginal costs h0 the
lower the demand for quality. Consequently, in order to make proÞts the
R&D Þrm needs to supply technology that decreases costs and, consequently,
as a second order eect, increases the quality increasing technology employed
by the hospital.
Instead, when (initial) marginal costs of treatment are lower,
Proposition 3 Let
h0 5
t0 + dU
1 u >
d2U+ dt0
2
¸
> u ? 1
then the constraint h  h0 is binding and the technology developed decreases
initial marginal costs while its impact on quality level is ambiguous4. This
technology is characterized by,
wW = dU+ t0
2d (1 u) > h
W = h0> tW =
1
2
(t0  dU) (5)
Proof. Proof in Appendix
The quality of treatment will depend on the trade-o between the reim-
bursement level and the status quo marginal cost, i.e., the demand for quality
varies positively with the reimbursement level and negatively with the initial
marginal cost. Anticipating this reaction by the hospital, the R&D Þrm is
better o by supplying cost decreasing quality such that the negative impact
4With the Þrst condition ensuring h $ h0 is binding and that the participatiuon con-
straint of the hospital is satisÞed, while the second that the second order conditions for a
maximum hold
10
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of h0 is decreased and, therefore, the demand for quality simply depends on
the reimbursement level and the technology price. For su!ciently high
reimbursement fees the hospital will demand quality increasing technology,
while, if the reimbursement fee is high enough, precisely for U A t0d then
the technology adopted and developed will be quality increasing.
Comparative Statics We now proceed with a comparative statics analy-
sis. According to the dierent optima found. The following proposition
summarizes the comparative statics results.
Proposition 4 For high initial marginal costs of treatment h0, the equilib-
rium is characterized by (4) and, therefore, the comparative statics analysis
is described by,
Cw
CU =
1
2 (1 u) d2 (u  1)2
(6)
Cw
Cu =
d2 (u  1) (h0 + 2U) + 2Uh
d2 (u  1)2 + 2 (u  1)
i2
Ch
CU =
d2
d2 (u  1) + 2
Ch
Cu =
d2
¡
2h0  d2U dt0
¢
[d2 (1 u) + 2]2
Ct
CU =
d
d2 (1 u) 2
Ct
Cu =
d
¡
d2U+ dt0  2h0
¢
[d2 (u  1) + 2]2
While for low initial marginal costs of treatment h0 the equilibrium is char-
acterized by (5) and, therefore, the comparative statics analysis is described
by,
Cw
CU =
1
2 (1 u) >
Ch
CU =
Ch
Cu =
Ct
Cu = 0 (7)
Ct
CU = 
d
2
Given the results above we can state the following,
Corollary 5 For ; h0 quality is strictly increasing with the reimbursement
fee U and increasing in the reimbursement rate u. Technology price is strictly
11
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increasing in both reimbursement variables and marginal costs are decreasing
in both reimbursement parameters. That is,
Cw
CU A 0,
Cw
Cu A 0,
Ct
CU ? 0,
Ct
Cu  0,
Ch
Cu  0,
Ch
CU  0
Proof. For h0  d
2U
2 given that the conditions for the existence of this
optimum require that h0  d
2U+dt0
2 and d2 ? 2(13u)5 we have that in (6)
Cw
CU A 0> CwCu A 0> ChCU A 0> ChCu A 0>
Ct
CU ? 0
Ct
Cu ? 06= For h0 ?
d2U+dt0
2 technology
developed will be characterized by (5), it then follows from (7) that CwCU A 0>
Ch
CU A 0>
Ct
CU ? 0> ChCu A 0>
Ct
Cu ? 0 Q.E.D.
3.5 Pure Prospective Payment System
We can now analyze the technology characteristics at the optimum as well
as its price for a pure Prospective Payment system, i.e., for u = 0 and U A 0=
Plugging u = 0> on (4) under a pure PPS, at the optimum, the technology
developed and adopted will be cost decreasing but the eect on quality will
depend on the reimbursement level. This optimum is characterized by,
hSSVW = d [U h0] d+ t0
2 d2 (8)
wSSVW = d [h0 U] t0d [d2  2]
tSSVW = d [h0 U] + t0
£
1 d2
¤
2 d2
From Proposition 2 we have that U A h0  t0d and 2  d2 A 0. Hence,
technology adopted and developed will decrease costs. Concerning the eect
of technology on quality, it depends on the reimbursement fee U> i.e., for a
su!ciently high reimbursement fee, technology will be quality increasing.7
Both, the cost decreasing parameter and the level of quality are increas-
ing in the reimbursement fee.8 Nevertheless, increasing the level of reim-
bursement drives the technology price up.
5With the Þrst condition arising from the constraint h $ h0 being slack and the second
by concavity of the proÞt function
6Note that CtCu ? 0i CtCu A 0 and CtCU ? 0i CtCU A 0
7This treshold is given by U A h0 + t0 (
13d2)
t
8 Indeed, Ct

CU ? 0i CtCU A 0
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3.6 Pure Cost Based Reimbursement System
In a pure CBR we have that U = 0= Hence, plugging U on (4), the optimum
is characterized by:
For h 5
h
dt0
2 >
t0
d(13u)
i
wFEU = d (1 u) h0  t0
d
h
d2 (u  1)2 + 2 (u  1)
i (9)
hFEU = d [(u  1) h0] d+ t0d2 (u  1) + 2 A 0
tFEU = d (1 u) h0 + t0
£
1 + d2 (u  1)
¤
d2 (u  1) + 2
Technology, in equilibrium will decrease costs. The impact of technol-
ogy on quality will depend on the reimbursement rate. For a su!ciently
low reimbursement rate u technology will decrease the level of quality Oth-
erwise, i.e. for high reimbursement rates, technology will increase the level
of quality.9
3.7 Some remarks
Before proceeding with the optimal reimbursement it is useful to make a
comment on the possible values of the reimbursement rate u.
The existence of the optima found above require an u ? 1= Nonetheless,
one could ask what happens in the other possible values of u. For u = 1,
in a mixed reimbursement system, the hospital demand for quality will not
depend neither on the technology price nor on the cost decreasing parameter.
Hence, the R&D Þrm will produce quality increasing technology but at an
inÞnite price and this technology will not contribute for the decrease of the
marginal cost of treatment. Indeed, for u = 1 the hospital problem becomes
max
t
K = Udt 
t2
2
Solving the Þrst order conditions the maximum is given by tW = Ud.
Plugging into the R&D Þrm proÞt function and maximizing with respect to
w and h,
9This threshold is given by u = dh0dh0+t0
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max
w>h
U&G = wd (t0 +Ud)
h2
2
Dierentiation with respect to w and h yields,
CU&G
Cw = d (t0 +Ud) A 0
CU&G
Ch = h ? 0
Therefore, having that CU&GCw A 0 and
CU&G
Ch ? 0 in equilibrium wW $ +4
and hW $ 4.
Under this scenario, in a pure CBR (U = 0) with full cost reimbursement,
u = 1, one can see that, as the design costs are Þnancial responsibility of
the hospital, its best strategy is to supply no additional quality in order to
avoid negative proÞts.
Instead, an u A 1 means that the hospital is reimbursed for more than
the incurred marginal costs. This means that the government is left with the
whole responsibility of these costs. In such a case, in a mixed reimbursement
system and in a pure CBR, one can easily see that the hospital and the
R&D Þrm strategies result in that the technology developed and adopted is
traded, at the optimum, at an inÞnite price. Moreover, this technology will
be inÞnitely quality increasing and will not contribute for the decrease of
the marginal cost of treatment. In this case, our results match the existing
literature. In a pure Cost Based Reimbursement System quality is provided
but at very high costs. Furthermore, a pure Cost Based Reimbursement
System provides more quality than a pure Prospective Payment System.
3.8 Optimal reimbursement
Finally, on the Þrst stage, accounting for the hospital and the R&D Þrm
behavior, the government will decide on the reimbursement variables: u and
U.
The government will then maximize an utilitarian social welfare function
Z by deciding on the reimbursement system to be implemented having as
instruments the reimbursement variables u and U,
max
u>U
Z = FV +K +U&G
(1 + ) [UG + u(h0  h+ w)G]
v=w= UG  0
14
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Where the Þrst term FV is patients surplus and is given by d (t03t)
2
2 , the
second term K stands for the hospital proÞt and is given by G [U (1 u)
(h0  h+ w)] t
2
2 , U&G = wG h
2
2 is the R&D Þrm proÞt and (1+)UG+
+(1+)u(h0 h+ w)G is the government reimbursement to the hospital
weighed by the cost of public funds =
Proposition 6 For h0 ? min
nI
2t0(1+)
1+43d >
dt0(1+)
1+43d
o
and  5
¤d31
4 > 1+d2
¤
10
the optimal reimbursement is characterized by a prospective payment sys-
tem,and will be given by
uW = 0 (10)
UW = t0 (1 + d 2)d (1 + 4 d)
Implying that technology in the optimum is characterized by
tW = t0 (d 3)d 1 4
wW = t0(1 + )
(1 + 4 d) d
hW = h0
For h0 5
hI
2t0(1+)
1+23d >
dt0(1+)
1+23d
i
,  A d312 and 2  d2 A 0 11 the optimal
reimbursement is characterized by a mixed payment system, in particular
uW = 1 2t
2
0 (1 + )2
h20 (d 1 2)2
(11)
UW = (d+ 1) t0
(2+ 1 d) d
10Where h0 A
I
2t0(1+)
1+43d arises from U&G D 0 binding, h0 ?
dt0(1+)
1+43d ensures that the
optimum from the R&D is valid and  M
%d31
4
> 1+d
2
%
gives the parameters interval for
which the second order conditions are satisÞed as well as ensuring that U D 0
11With h0 D
I
2t0(1+)
1+23d ensuring that u D 0, h0 ?
dt0(1+)
1+23d and 23d2 A 0 corresponding
to the parameter values for which the corresponding R&D optimum is deÞned for,  D d312
can be obtained by solving for  U D 0 and w D 0 . Note that the second order conditions
for a maximum are always satisÞed
15
Hospital financing and the development and adoption of new technologies
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Implying that technology in the optimum is characterized by
tW = ( d) t0
2+ 1 d
wW = (2+ 1 d) h
2
0
2t0 (1 + ) d
hW = h0
Finally, for h0  dt0(1+)1+43d3d2 and  A d+123d2 12 the optimal reimbursement
will be given by
uW = 0 (12)
UW = (dh0  t0) (d+ d
2+ 1 2)
d (1 4+ 2d2+ d+ d2)
Implying that technology in the optimum is characterized by
hW = d (1 + ) (dh0  t0)1 4+ 2d2+ d+ d2
tW = t0
¡
2d2 + d2 + d 3
¢
 dh0 (1 + )
1 4+ 2d2+ d+ d2
wW = (1 + ) (dh0  t0)d (1 4+ 2d2+ d+ d2)
Proof. Proof in Appendix
First notice that the welfare function is always increasing in h, indeed
the welfare function Z can be re-written as Z = K +U&G+dt{ t2  (1+
)[U+ u(h0 h+ w)]} with K being the hospital proÞt and U&G the R&D
Þrm proÞt. The socially optimal level of h is given by
gZ
gh =
gK
gh +
gU&G
gh + dt(2 + )u
=
gU&G
gh + dt(2 + )u
From the envelope theorem gU&Ggh = 0 in case 2
gU&G
gh A 0 in case 1 of
the R&D problem, what implies that gZgh A 0 i.e. the social welfare is
12The Þrst condition ensures that the optimum from the R&D is valid. Note that for
this range os parameters the participation constraint of the R&D Þrm is always satisÞed.
The second condition corresnponds to the second order condition for a maximum.
16
CHE Research Paper 26
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
always increasing in h. Hence, it is always socially optimal to have hW = h0.
Moreover, notice that,
gZ
gw =
gK
gw +
gU&G
gw  dt(1 + )u
By the envelope theorem we know that gU&Ggw = 0, therefore,
gZ
gw =
gK
gw +
gU&G
gw  dt(1 + )u
= G (u  1 (1 + )u) ? 0
Consequently, the central planner will aim at inducing the minimum pos-
sible price, the highest possible cost containment as well as the optimal
quality level through the use of the two instruments {U> u}. In the second
case (5) the R&D Þrm already chooses the socially optimal level of h. The
planner is then left with two instruments to induce the optimal quality and
technology price. We further know that gwgu A 0> gwgU A 0 while
gt
gu = 0 and
gt
gU A 0. Therefore, optimal quality will be induced using U while technol-
ogy price will be controlled via u. Therefore, we would envisage that the
optimal reimbursement system would be characterized by a pure prospec-
tive payment system with the reimbursement rate u set at its minimum,
i.e. u = 0, and a positive fee, U A 0, in order to, respectively, induce the
optimal price and the optimal quality. Nevertheless, the government must
further ensure that the participation constraint of the R&D Þrm is satisÞed.
While for h0 ? min
nI
2t0(1+)
1+43d >
dt0(1+)
1+43d
o
a prospective scheme ensures non
negative proÞts for the R&D Þrm, for higher status quo cost parameters,
i.e. h0 5
hI
2t0(1+)
1+23d >
dt0(1+)
1+23d
i
, under a fully prospective payment system the
R&D Þrm would exit the market. In this case the planner must allow for
a positive reimbursement rate u A 0 in order to ensure the R&D participa-
tion constraint is just satisÞed. Therefore, for low h0 a prospective payment
system is optimal and is characterized by (10) while for intermediate cost
parameters the optimal reimbursement is a mixed system. For higher cost
parameters, i.e. h0  dt0(1+)1+43d3d2 the optimal h chosen by the R&D Þrm
not necessarily corresponds to the socially optimal level (4). Therefore, the
government has now less instruments (U> u) than variables to control (w> t> h),
meaning that it will not be able to induce the Þrst best for all variables (12).
17
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4 R&D within the Hospital
4.1 The model
We will now consider the case where the R&D and the Hospital are vertically
integrated, i.e., the R&D process is carried out by the hospital. The model
has then only two agents: the government and the hospital. The model
speciÞcations remain as described in the section 2.
The government decides on the reimbursement scheme: U (Prospective
Payment system fee) and u (Cost Based reimbursement rate), while the
hospital decides on the technology to be developed and adopted.
4.2 Timing
The game will then be developed in a two stage game described in the
following diagram,
Hospital
(e,q)
Government
(R,r)
In the Þrst stage, the government decides on the optimal way to Þnance
the hospital by (optimally) deciding on the reimbursement instruments U
and u and on the second stage the hospital decides on the characteristics of
the technology to be developed and adopted (t> h).
As usual, the model will be solved backwards.
4.3 The hospital problem
The hospital objective function is thus:
max K =
t>h
UG + (u  1)(h0  h)dt 
t2
2
 h
2
2
v=w= h  h0> t0  t> t0  t A h0  h
With G = dt=
18
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Solving the Þrst order conditions for t and h the optima are characterized
by two cases described in the following sub sections. Depending on the value
of the initial marginal costs of treatment, h0, solutions will dier. For low
(initial) marginal costs results are as described in case 1 while for high
(initial) marginal costs results are described by case 2.
4.3.1 Case 1: h = h0
Proposition 7 For h  h0 binding, i.e., for h0 5 [0> d (1 u) [dU+ t0]] we
have that at the optimum the hospital will set
hW = h0> tW = dU (13)
Proof. Proof in Appendix
The condition states the parameters values for which h  h0 binds. Note
that second order conditions for a maximum are always satisÞed.
In this case technology, at the optimum, will increase quality and de-
crease costs. Both, the quality level and the cost decreasing parameter do
not vary with the reimbursement rate u. Moreover, the reimbursement fee
U has a positive impact on quality and a null impact on costs.
Corollary 8 Under a pure PPS technology is cost decreasing and quality
increasing
tWSSV = dU, hWSSV = h0 (14)
While for a pure CBR technology is quality neutral but cost decreasing and
is characterized by,
hWFEU = h0> tWFEU = 0
Proof. The proof is obtained by substitution on the equilibrium u = 0 for
a PPS and U = 0 in the CBR case.
Comparing the two reimbursement systems, Prospective Payment and
Cost Based Reimbursement, in a pure PPS the level of quality is higher
than under a pure Cost Based Reimbursement system. Nevertheless, both
systems are equally e!cient in cost control incentives13.
13 In a pure PPS we have that u = 0 and U A 0 hence the technology developed and
adopted is characterized by:
tSSV = 3dU ? 0> hSSV = h0
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Indeed, a pure CBR does not reward quality investment for u  1, while
under a pure PPS increasing quality has a positive impact on proÞts via
increased demand. Given that the initial marginal costs h0 are su!ciently
low (by deÞnition of this case), under both systems it will be proÞtable
to decrease them totally as the marginal beneÞt of reducing it (decreased
marginal cost of treatment) exceeds the marginal cost (design cost).
4.3.2 Case 2: h  h0
Proposition 9 For h0 5
¸
d [dU+ t0] (1 u) > t0(13d(13u)
2)+dU(13d(u31))
1+d(13u)[(u32)(13u)d]

and
1 d2 (u  1)2 A 014in equilibrium technology supplied is characterized by
hW = d (1 u)
dU+ (u  1) (dh0 (u  1) + t0)
1 d2 (u  1)2
¸
(15)
tW = d

(1 u) [h0 + dt0 (u  1)]U
1 d2 (u  1)2
¸
Proof. Proof in Appendix
Even though the technology adopted is always cost decreasing its impact
on the quality level will depend on the initial marginal costs.
For h0 5
h
d (1 u) [dU+ t0] > dt0 (1 u) + U(13u)
i
the level of quality will
be increased by technology. For h0 5
h
dt0 (1 u) + U(13u) >
t0
d(13u) +
U
(13u)
i
technology is quality decreasing. On what concerns costs, technology is
always cost decreasing.
Indeed, under a mixed reimbursement system, increasing quality aects
proÞts through a rise in demand. If the (initial) marginal cost is considerably
low, then the marginal revenue arising on increased demand exceeds the
marginal cost and therefore it is proÞtable to invest in quality. The marginal
cost of supplying an extra unit of quality is increasing in the marginal cost of
With quality level given by t = t0 3 t we have that in the optimum t = t0 +Ud=
In a pure CBR U = 0 and u A 0= Thus, the technology developed and adopted in this
case is characterized by:
tFEU = 0, hFEU = h0
With d A 0, U A 0 and the quality level given by t = t0 3 t> the result follows
tSSV A tFEU and hSSV = hFEU
14The Þrst condition deÞnes the range of parameters for which the constraint h $ h0
and is slack and for which t0 3 t A h0 3 h holds while the second condition ensures that
the second order conditions for a maximum are satisÞed
20
CHE Research Paper 26
______________________________________________________________________________ 
treatment and consequently on the initial marginal cost h0, therefore higher
h0 reduce the proÞtability of investing in quality.
It is now useful to analyze the optima of a pure Prospective Payment
System and of a pure Cost Based Reimbursement System.
Proposition 10 A pure Cost Based Reimbursement system leads to the
development and adoption of both quality and cost decreasing technologies.
While in a pure PPS, technology, at the optimum, will be cost decreasing.
Its impact on quality level depends on the reimbursement fee U. For highly
enough reimbursement levels technology is quality increasing.
Corollary 11 Comparing the two systems, the eectiveness in cost control
depends on the reimbursement schedule. In what concerns quality, for a
su!ciently high reimbursement fee, i.e. U A h0  dt0, technology developed
under a PPS increases quality while within a CBR system it decreases the
level of quality. For low reimbursement fees both systems decrease quality.
The relative magnitude of this eect will depend on the relation between the
two reimbursement instruments - u and U=
Proof. In a pure CBR system we have that, at the optimum, the hospital
will set (t> h) such that,
tFEU = d(u  1) h0 + dt0 (u  1)
2
d2 (u  1)2  1
> hFEU = d
2 (u  1)2 h0 + d (u  1) t0
d2 (u  1)2  1
As, by concavity, d (u  1)21 ? 0 a h0 5
h
t0
d(13u) +
U
(13u) > d (1 u) [dU+ t0]
i
implies tFEU A 0 and hFEU ? 0. Under a PPS u = 0. Hence, the optimum
is given by,
tSSV = dh0 U dt0
1 d2 > h
SSV = ddU+ dh0  t0
1 d2
Furthermore, under a pure PPS we have that, by concavity 1  d2 A 0.
Moreover, this optimum is deÞned for h0 5
¤
d2U+ dt0> dt0 +U
£
15. Hence,
we have that U A h0  dt0 , tW ? 0, technology increases the quality
level. While for U ? h0  dt0 , tW A 0, technology is quality decreasing.
Concerning h we have that h0 ? dt0 +U, hW A 0 Q.E.D.
Summarizing the results described under the previous two cases, for a
mixed reimbursement system, for low levels of the initial marginal cost h0
15Condition that states t $ t0 and h $ h0
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technology is cost decreasing and quality increasing, moreover technology
completely osets the marginal cost of treatment (h = h0). For intermediate
values of h0, technology decreases costs and increases quality, but in this case
it is no longer proÞtable to completely oset the marginal cost of treatment.
Finally, for higher levels of h0, technology decreases both quality and costs.
Consequently, results show that, in a sense, the priority is to achieve low
treatment costs, and, just then, there is investment on quality improvements.
4.4 Optimal reimbursement
Finally, given the hospital behavior the government will decide on the reim-
bursement variables. The government objective will be to decide on the re-
imbursement policy by, optimally, choosing the reimbursement instruments
in order to maximize social welfare Z ,
max
u>U
Z = FV +K  (1 + ) [Udt + u(h0  h)dt]
Where the Þrst term FV is patients surplus and is given by d(t03t)
2
2 the
second term K stands for the hospital proÞt and is given by [U (1 u)
(h0  h)] dt  t
2
2  h
2
2 and (1 + ) [Udt + u(h0  h)dt] is the government
reimbursement to the hospital weighed by the cost of public funds .
Proposition 12 For h0 ? dt0(1+)2+13d > 1 + 2  d A 0 16 the optimal reim-
bursement system is characterized by a pure prospective payment system
given by17
uW = 0
UW = (d ) t0d (2+ 1 d)
Proof. Proof in Appendix
Therefore, technology is characterized by
hW = h0
tW = t0 (d )d 1 2
16First condition ensures that the conditions for which the hospital optimum exists hold.
The second condition is a second order necessary condition for a maximum.
17Note that none of the variables chosen by the hospital depend on u
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Proposition 13 For h0  dt0(1+)2+13d3d2 >  A d+d
231
(13d2)2
18 the optimal reim-
bursement system is characterized by a prospective payment system given
by19
UW =
¡
d+ d2 
¢
(dh0  t0)
d (d+ d2 + 2d2  1 2)
uW = 0
Proof. Proof in Appendix
Therefore technology is characterized by
hW = (1 + ) (dh0  t0) dd+ d2 + 2d2  1 2
tW =
¡
d2 + d+ 2d2 
¢
t0  h0d (1 + )
d+ d2 + 2d2  1 2
Given that,
gZ
gh =
gK
gh + dt(1 + )u
From the envelope theorem gKgh = 0 in case 2 and
gK
gh A 0 in case 1 of
the hospital problem, what implies that gZgh A 0 i.e. the social welfare is
increasing in h. Hence, it is always socially optimal to have hW = h0. Notice
that in this case we have that the planner has two instruments and two
variables to control for and therefore, in principle, it should be feasible to
induce the Þrst best levels of cost containment and quality. In the Þrst case
(14) of the hospital problem the optimal level of h is already chosen. There-
fore, the two Þnancial instruments can be used to implement the optimal
quality. Given that gtgu = 0>
gt
gU A 0 the optimum will be characterized by
a prospective payment scheme. In the second case (15) the planner has to
induce the optimal levels of both h and t. For these range of parameters
the Þrst best would be implemented with a scheme where U A 0 but u ? 0,
meaning that the hospital would be reimbursed on a proportion higher than
his total costs. Nevertheless, such feature is not contemplated in our model
as we constrain the reimbursement fee to be non negative meaning that the
best the planner can do is implement a prospective payment system where
uW = 0.
18First condition ensures that the conditions for which the hospital optimum exists hold.
The second condition is a second order necessary condition for a maximum.
19Note that none of the variables chosen by the hospital depend on u
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5 Conclusions
Previous literature on the impact of reimbursement systems on quality and
on cost decreasing eorts has mostly concluded that, while retrospective
reimbursement encourages quality but lacks sensitivity towards cost con-
tainment, PPS encourages cost e!ciency but has perverse eects on quality
improvement. Nevertheless, we have shown that, within the described set
up, these results may not hold.
We focus our analysis on technology development and adoption under
two set-ups: private R&D and R&D within the hospital.
In the Þrst best, for low values of the status quo marginal cost technol-
ogy not only increases quality but also drives marginal costs to zero. For
intermediate values of the status quo marginal cost technology is cost de-
creasing and quality increasing. Finally, for high marginal costs, technology
still decreases the marginal costs to zero but also decreases quality.
In the former set up results depend on the value of the reimbursement
rate u= We have been able to show that, for u ? 1> under a mixed reim-
bursement system there is space for the development and adoption of cost
decreasing/quality increasing technologies. By Þrst treating the reimburse-
ment as exogenous, we have shown that under both reimbursement systems,
Cost Based Reimbursement System and Prospective Payment System, tech-
nology developed and adopted is cost decreasing. In what concerns quality,
under a MRS, for su!ciently high reimbursement fees technology developed
and adopted will increase quality. Under a PPS,results remain qualitatively
the same= For a su!ciently high reimbursement fee, technology increases the
initial level of quality. Nonetheless, the higher the reimbursement fee the
more expensive technology will be. Under CBR for medium initial marginal
costs the impact of technology on quality depends on the reimbursement
rate u, for a su!ciently high reimbursement rate technology increases the
level of quality. However, for su!ciently low initial marginal costs, tech-
nology decreases quality. Moreover, as this quality level does not depend
on the reimbursement variable, the latter can not be used as a quality level
regulatory instrument.
For u = 1, in a mixed reimbursement system, the hospital demand for
quality will not depend neither on the technology price nor on the cost
decreasing parameter w. Hence, the R&D Þrm will produce quality increasing
technology but at an inÞnite price and this technology will not contribute
for the decrease of the marginal cost of treatment. Under this scenario, in a
pure CBR (U = 0) with full cost reimbursement, u = 1, one can see that, as
the design costs are Þnancial responsibility of the hospital, its best strategy
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is to supply no quality in order to avoid negative proÞts.
Instead, for a reimbursement rate u A 1, our results match the existing
literature. In a pure Cost Based Reimbursement System quality is provided
but at very high costs. Furthermore, a pure Cost Based Reimbursement
System provides more quality than a pure Prospective Payment System.
Finally, going one step further and endogeneising the reimbursement de-
cision stage, we have also been able to show that depending on the costs
of treatment pre technology adoption the optimal reimbursement scheme is
either fully prospective or mixed.
In the latter case, when the R&D is carried out within the hospital, for
high initial marginal costs, a pure prospective payment system leads to the
adoption of cost decreasing technologies. The impact of technology on qual-
ity will depend on the level of the reimbursement fee (for high reimbursement
fees technology will increase quality). On the other hand, under a pure Cost
Based Reimbursement system, after technology development and adoption
quality will be higher but also the marginal costs.
For low initial marginal costs, PPS is e!cient in cost control and quality
improvement. Indeed, technology adopted is cost decreasing and quality
increasing. On the other hand, under CBR the type of technology developed
and adopted has no impact on quality even though it decreases costs.
Comparing the two reimbursement systems, we may conclude that, if the
reimbursement rate u is less than unity then a pure Prospective payment sys-
tem provides more incentives for the development of quality increasing/cost
decreasing technologies. For an u greater than unity we found that, in what
concerns costs savings, a pure Prospective Payment System is more e!cient.
Concerning quality, we have been able to show that, for a su!ciently high
prospective reimbursement fee U> the technologies developed under a pure
prospective payment system provide more quality than the ones developed
under a pure Cost Based Reimbursement system. Finally, by endogeneising
the reimbursement policy, we found that, it is optimal for the government
to reimburse the hospital on a prospective or mixed basis.
We use a simple setup, allowing us to obtain clear-cut results and to
highlight the eects driving the technology choices under each Þnancing
scheme and R&D sector. Nevertheless, the model could be extended in a
number of directions, enriching the set of results. One could have considered
asymmetric information and heterogeneous patients. With heterogeneity
in patients severity, the treatment costs are not contractible, making it
proÞtable for the hospital to misreport the costs incurred. In this case,
the technology developed and adopted could assume dierent characteristics
from the ones that arise from our optima.
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Another possible extension to our model would be the dierentiation
between services which quality is perfectly perceived by the patients from
services where patients are not enough informed to detect its quality. For
example, a patient might be sensitive to the type of technology used on
his treatment but then not aware of the right number of sessions needed
before discharge. In such a context one can expect that the hospital would
only supply quality in the type of treatment where the patients can detect
quality.
A third aspect is that we consider that patients demand for treatment
is sensitive to quality. In the real world this is not always true. For instance
we have that in emergency treatment, even if this assumption holds, in the
end the demand that the hospital faces is not aected by this sensitivity.
Finally, one could also introduce competition between hospitals and,
maybe more crucial, in the R&D sector.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of propositions 2 and 3
The R&D problem is given by,
max
h>w
wdt  h
2
2
v=w= h  h0, w  h
tW = d [(1 u)(h0  h+ w)U]
The constraint w  h will be controled ex-post, i.e. we solve for the is then
given by,
L = wdt(tW (h> w) > h> w) h
2
2
 (h h0)
For  A 0 solving the Þrst order conditions we have that
wW = t0 + dU
2d (1 u) > h
W = h0
W = dt0 + d
2U
2
 h0
Therefore the complementary slackness conditions implies that h0 ? dt0+d
2U
2 .
The second order conditions for a maximum are satisÞed. Indeed, the bor-
dered Hessian is given by
K =
5
97
0 Cj(h)Cw
Cj(h)
Ch
Cj(h)
Cw
C2L
Cw2
C2L
CwCh
Cj(h)
Ch
C2L
ChCw
C2L
Ch2
6
:8
Where j (h)  h  h0. We still need to check that the sign of the determinant
of the bordered Hessian is the same as (1)q = 1 A 0 where q states the
number of variables. Computing the determinant it can be easily shown that
|K| = C2LCw2 = 2d2 (1 u) A 0 / u ? 1= Therefore the su!cient condition
for a maximum is ensured if and only if u ? 1.
The constraint t0  t A h0  h is always satisÞed, indeed t0+dU2 A 0.
Finally, the constraint wW  hW =, h0  t0+dU2d(13u) =
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On the other hand suppose that  = 0: in this case solving the Þrst
order conditions we Þnd that in equilibrium
wW = d [(1 u) h0 U] t0
d
h
d2 (u  1)2 + 2 (u  1)
i
hW = d [U+ (u  1) h0] d+ t0d2 (u  1) + 2
It is easy to show that the determinant of the Hessian for this case is
given by,
|K| = d2 (1 u)
¡
2 d2 (u  1)
¢
Therefore the su!cient condition for a maximum is ensured if and only if 2
d2 (u  1) A 0 .The complementary slackness condition requires that CLC[ =
2h03dt03d2U
23d2(13u)  0. Given that the second order conditions for a maximum
require 2d2 (u  1), the complementary slackness condition is then satisÞed
as long as h0  dt0+d
2U
2 .
To check that tW  t0 holds. Plugging tW and solving tWt0 = 0 for h0 it
follows that the condition is satisÞed as long as h0  t0d(13u)+ U13u = Moreover,
t0  t A h0  h =, h0 ? (dU+t0)(1+d)2+d(13u) = Meaning that this equilibrium is
deÞned for h0 ? min
n
t0
d(13u) +
U
13u >
(dU+t0)(1+d)
2+d(13u)
o
Checking the constraint wW  hW can be written as
d [U+ (u  1) h0] d+ t0d2 (u  1) + 2 
d [(1 u) h0 U] t0
d
h
d2 (u  1)2 + 2 (u  1)
i =
implying (13d
2(13u))
d(u31)(23d2(13u)) (t0 + dU dh0 (1 u))  0
We know that from SOCs 2d2 (u  1) A 0 moreover u 5 [0> 1] therefore
(1 d2 (1 u))
d (u  1) (2 d2 (1 u)) (t0 + dU dh0 (1 u))  0
implies that
(1 d2 (1 u)) (t0 + dU dh0 (1 u))  0
Suppose for now that 1 d2 (1 u) A 0 then it must be that
t0 + dU dh0 (1 u)  0 =, h0 
t0 + dU
1 u
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Recall that the complementary slackness condition required h0  dt0+d
2U
2 .
Therefore these conditions can be written as h0  max
n
t0+dU
13u >
dt0+d2U
2
o
. It
is easy to see that for 2d2 (u  1) A 0 the max
n
t0+dU
13u >
dt0+d2U
2
o
= t0+dU13u .
Now if 1d2 (1 u) ? 0 then it must be that h0  t0+dU13u . Given that the
complementary slackness condition required h0  dt0+d
2U
2 and tW  t0 =,
h0  t0d(13u) + U13u then the optimum is valid for
h0 5
dt0 + d2U
2
>min
½ t0
d (1 u) +
U
1 u >
t0 + dU
1 u
¾¸
. Given that 1d2 (1 u) ? 0 =, min
n
t0
d(13u) +
U
13u >
t0+dU
13u
o
= t0d(13u)+
U
13u
therefore the solution is valid for h0 5
h
dt0+d2U
2 > U13u >
t0+dU
13u
i
=
A.2 Proof of propositions 7 and 8
Notice that the constraint t0  t will never bind otherwise the hospital will
make negative proÞts. Therefore, the hospital problem can be written as
following optimization problem,
max
t>h
L = Udt + (u  1)(h0  h)dt 
t2
2
 h
2
2
 (h h0)
For  A 0 solving the Þrst order conditions we have that
tW = dU> hW = h0
W = h0  d [dU+ t0] (1 u)
Therefore the complementary slackness conditions implies that
h0 ? d [dU+ t0] (1 u)
The second order conditions for a maximum are satisÞed. Indeed, the bor-
dered Hessian is given by
K =
5
97
0 Cj(h)Ct
Cj(h)
Ch
Cj(h)
Ct
C2L
Ct2
C2L
CtCh
Cj(h)
Ch
C2L
ChCt
C2L
Ch2
6
:8 =
5
7
0 0 1
0 1 (u  1)d
1 (u  1)d 1
6
8
Where j (h)  h  h0. We still need to check that the sign of the determinant
of the bordered Hessian is the same as (1)q = 1 A 0 where q states the
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number of variables. Computing the determinant it can be easily shown
that
¯¯
K
¯¯
= 1 A 0 and therefore the su!cient condition for a maximum is
ensured.
Finally t0  tW A h0  hW is always satisÞed indeed t0 + dU A 0.
On the other hand suppose that  = 0: in this case solving the Þrst
order conditions we Þnd that in equilibrium
hW = d (1 u)
dU+ (u  1) (dh0 (u  1) + t0)
1 d2 (u  1)2
¸
tW = d

(1 u) [h0 + dt0 (u  1)]U
1 d2 (u  1)2
¸
The complementary slackness condition requires that CLC[ A 0 implying that
this equilibrium is valid as long as h0  d [dU+ t0] (1 u). Computing the
second order conditions it can be easily shown that this is a maximum for 1
d2(u1)2 A 0. Finally t0 tW A h0hW =, h0 ? t0(13d(13u)
2)+dU(13d(u31))
1+d(13u)[(u32)(13u)d] =
A.3 Proof of Proposition 6
The optimization problem of the government is given by
max
u>U
Z = FV +K +U&G
(1 + ) [UG + u(h0  h+ w)G]
v=w= UG  0> u  0
The Lagrangian for this problem is given by
L =Z 
 (UG) (u)
With {
>} being the Lagrangian multipliers.
For the Þrst solution on the R&D problem we have that it can easily be
proved that if 
 A 0 then  = 0 and for 
 = 0 the  A 0. So we are left
with two cases.
For {
 A 0> = 0} solving
© CL
CU > CLCu > CLCC
ª
for {U> u>
} we have that
uW = 1 2t
2
0 (1 + )2
h20 (d 1 2)2
(16)
UW = (d+ 1) t0
(2+ 1 d) d

W =  (17)
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We further know that from the R&D stage the R&D equilibrium was deÞned
for
h0 ?
dt0 + d2U
2
=, h0 ?
dt0 (1 + )
2+ 1 d
u ? 1 =, 1 2d+ d2 + 4 4d+ 42 A 0
The second order conditions require that the determinant of bordered Hessian
being positive. With the bordered Hessian given by
K =
5
97
0 CUGCU
CUG
Cu
CUG
CU
C2L
CU2
C2L
CUCu
CUG
Cu
C2L
CuCU
C2L
Cu2
6
:8
It follows that
¯¯
K
¯¯
= d264
(1+432d+42+d234d)(d3132)3h80
t40(+1)
2(2+2+1)
. For
¯¯
K
¯¯
A 0
we need to impose 
¡
1 + 4 2d+ 42 + d2  4d
¢
(d 1 2)3 h80 A 0.
Notice that U A 0 =,  A d312 . Therefore it follows that
¯¯
K
¯¯
A 0 lii
1  2d + d2 + 4  4d + 42 A 0 =,  A d+d23d
2(23d2) . Combining these two
conditions on  we have that  A max
n
d+d23d
2(23d2) >
d31
2
o
= d312 =
Finally, the complementary slackness condition requires CLCx A 0 implying
that h0 
I
2t0(1+)
1+23d .
For 
 = 0 computing
© CL
CU > CLCu > CLCC
ª
it can be easily seen that CLCu ? 0.
Solving the system of two equations CLCU for U we have that
UW = t0 (1 + d 2)d (1 + 4 d)
uW = 0
The complementary slackness condition requires that CLCC A 0 implying that
this equilibrium is valid as long as h0 ?
I
2(1+)t0
4+13d . Computing the second
order conditions it can be easily shown that this is a maximum for 1 
d2(u  1)2 A 0= To check the second order conditions are satisÞed we need
to study the sign of the determinant bordered Hessian. Given that
¯¯
K
¯¯
=
d2 (4+ 1 d) and we have two variables and just one binding constraint
we need
¯¯
K
¯¯
A 0 that is true as long as 4+ 1 d A 0. Notice that U A 0
=, 1 + d 2 A 0 =,  ? 1+d2 .
Finally we know that the R&D solution exits for
h0 ?
dt0 + d2U
2
=, h0 ?
dt0 (1 + )
4+ 1 d
31
Hospital financing and the development and adoption of new technologies
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
and for u ? 1 that is always satisÞed.
For the second solution of the R&D problem following the same process
as above we Þnd that for {
 = 0> A 0}
uW = 0 (18)
UW = (dh0  t0) (d+ d
2+ 1 2)
d (1 4+ 2d2+ d+ d2)
Second order condition requires that
¯¯
K
¯¯
= d2 1+43d3d232d2
(d232)2 A 0 =, 1 +
4  d  d2  2d2 A 0 =,  A d+d231
2(23d2) . We further know that from the
R&D stage the R&D equilibrium was deÞned for
2 + d2 (u  1) A 0 =, d 
s
2
h0 
dt0 + d2U
2
,
(
1 + 4 d d2 A 0
h0  (1+)dt01+43d3d2
Notice that from the two conditions 1+4dd22d2 A 0 and 1+4
d  d2 A 0, the Þrst is more restrictive and therefore if veriÞed then the
second is automatically veriÞed too. Moreover, w A 0 =, h0 ? dt0 therefore
for U A 0 we need to impose that  A d+1
23d2 = These three conditions imply
that  A max
n
d+1
23d2 >
d+d231
2(23d2)
o
= d+1
23d2 .
The remaining possible combinations of the Lagrangian multipliers are
not feasible. Indeed, consider for instance the case 
 A 0> = 0 solving
the Þrst order conditions we Þnd that uW = 1  2d2 = u A 0 / d A
s
2.
However from the R&D stage we know that the R&D equilibrium is deÞned
for 2d2 (1 u) A 0. Plugging uW we have that the condition requires 0 A 0
that is obviously a contradiction.
A.4 Proof of Propositions 11 and 12
The optimization problem of the government is given by
max
u>U
Z = FV +K
(1 + ) [UG + u(h0  h)G]
v=w= u  0
With  being the Lagrangian multiplier.
For the Þrst solution on the R&D problem we have that variables do not
depend on u. As funds are costly then in equilibrium uW = 0= So we are left
with an optimization problem in one variable.
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Solving the Þrst order condition with respect to U we have that the
optimal solution is characterized by
uW = 0 (19)
UW = (d ) t0
(2+ 1 d) d
The second order conditions require that CZCU ? 0 / 1 + 2  d A 0. We
further know that from the R&D stage the R&D equilibrium was deÞned
for
h0 ? d [t0 + dU] (1 u) =, h0 ?
dt0 (1 + )
2+ 1 d
For the second solution of the R&D problem following the same process
as above we Þnd that the Þrst order condition for u is always negative and
therefore uW = 0. Solving the Þrst order condition of U we Þnd that
UW = (dh0  t0) (d+ d
2 )
d (1 2+ 2d2+ d+ d2)
Second order condition requires that
¯¯
K
¯¯
= d2 (31+d
2+2d232+d)
(31+d2)2 A 0 =,
= 1 + d2 + 2d2  2+ d ? 0= We further know that from the R&D stage
the R&D equilibrium was deÞned for
2 + d2 (u  1) A 0 =, d 
s
2
h0  d [t0 + dU] (1 u) =, h0 
dt0 (1 + )
2+ 1 d d2
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